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Matti Hyvärinen
The reception of Jerome Bruner’s extensive theoretical work on narrative has been paradoxical.
A substantial part of the commentary literature has confined itself to legitimatory uses of his
texts, writers too often being contented with repeating a selection of Bruner’s best known theses.
A critical reception in the meaning of testing, challenging, and further processing of Bruner’s
thought has remained rather sporadic. Perhaps Bruner looms too large to actually be seen. His
theory of folk psychology and the elements of canonicity and breach (1991, 11) in his narrative
theory constitute a major exception to this tendency, they being extensively discussed by David
Herman (2002, 2009, 2013) and Daniel D. Hutto (2004, 2007, 2008). Bruner’s theory of
canonicity and breach arguably constitutes a major theoretical contribution to the understanding
of the pragmatics of everyday storytelling. As an intervention into this dialogue, I take Bruner’s
principal idea under closer scrutiny, and claim that it potentially contains an unsolved
contradiction1.
I begin with a short summary of Bruner’s idea of folk psychology, canonicity, and breach. For
reasons of comparison, I extend my discussion into another major theoretical contribution of the
1990s, namely Monika Fludernik’s (1996) model of narrativity. Then I further elaborate
Bruner’s theory about expectations and canonicity with the help of a German historian of
concepts (Begriffsgeschichte), Reinhart Koselleck (2004), and his theory of expectation and
experience. Julian Barnes (2013) and Primo Levi (1996) provide the prime text examples for the
reflection of the role of expectations. Finally, I discuss a number of narrative modes –
hypothetical narrative, habitual narrative (Riessman 1990), and prospective narrative
(Georgakopoulou 2007) – that obviously depart from the narrative pragmatics suggested by
Bruner’s model.
Bruner’s proposal
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2Right at the beginning of his Acts of Meaning (1990; hereafter AM), Bruner voices his deep
disappointment with the development of the Cognitive Revolution, which was “intended to bring
‘mind’ back to the human sciences after a long winter of objectivism” (AM: 1). Bruner’s
intention, I think, is less to articulate a full-blown confrontation with the cognitivist theory as
such than to recover some of the original ideas of the Cognitive Revolution. Be that as it may,
already in 1990, Bruner criticized the cognitivist approach that a decade later constituted one of
the major trends in literary theory in the form of cognitive narratology (see, e.g., Fludernik 1996;
Herman 2003; Jahn 2005; Palmer 2004; Zunshine 2006).  From the very beginning, Bruner
introduced his idea of folk psychology “as an instrument of culture,” not as an individual-cum-
cognitivist capacity for mind reading. For this reason, as Bruner says, “culture is also constitutive
of mind. By virtue of this actualization of culture, meaning achieves a form that is public and
communal rather than private and autistic” (AM: 33). Because of his cultural emphasis, Bruner
does not privilege any narrowly psychological version of folk psychology; instead, for him, folk
social science and common sense would have been equally acceptable terms. By folk
psychology, he denotes “a system by which people organize their experience in, knowledge
about, and transactions with the social world” (35). Indeed, the instrument is cultural in the sense
that the organization of experience takes place more or less interactionally.
FP was defined as an instrument of culture, yet Bruner proceeds to consider “what kind of a
cognitive system is a folk psychology” (AM: 35). Obviously, we might be entitled to
characterize it as a system of cultural cognition. Bruner’s answer offers in a concise form most of
his key concepts: “Since its [FP’s] organizing principle is narrative rather than conceptual, I
shall have to consider the nature of narrative and how it is built around established or canonical
expectations and the mental management of deviations from such expectations” (35, italics
added). Here we already have narrative, canonical expectations, and the deviations from
expectations as basic elements of folk psychology.  Even though Bruner uses the term “theory of
mind,” in passing and with small letters, his previous formulation effectively claims that folk
psychology does not rest on theoretical, conceptual knowledge but is rather narratively
organized. I agree with the first part of this argument (that folk psychology does not rest on
theoretical understanding), yet I suspect that the latter part runs the risk of overextending the
conceptual range of narrative. I will return to the issue a bit later.
Because folk psychology is based on culture, it also evolves historically, altering “with the
culture’s changing responses to the world and to the people in it” (AM: 14). Bruner suggests that
it “is worth asking how the views of such intellectual heroes as Darwin, Marx, and Freud
3gradually became transformed and absorbed into the folk psychology.” In this sense, he uses
cultural psychology and cultural history as virtually interchangeable terms (14). The linguist
Charlotte Linde (1993: 163–191) has termed such recognizable loans from the cultural history in
life stories as “coherence systems,” arguing that they are located between common sense and
what she calls “expert systems.” To some extent, the nature of Bruner’s FP remains ambiguous
because his choice of terms in claiming that FP “… is a culture’s account of what makes human
beings tick. It includes a theory of mind, one’s and others’, a theory of motivation, and the rest”
(AM: 13, italics added), as if the understanding of minds might after all be a theoretical and
conceptual endeavour. However, Bruner does not renounce his distinction between
“paradigmatic” and “narrative” spheres of knowledge. Folk psychological understanding,
including this figurative theory of mind, still belongs to the side of narrative knowledge, and in
that sense does not contain ‘theories’ in the strict meaning of the term.
Bruner employs the concepts of “belief” and “desire,” only to connect them immediately to the
larger cultural fabric. He suggests that these “beliefs and desires become sufficiently coherent
and well organized as to merit being called ‘commitment’ or ‘ways of life,’ and such coherences
are seen as ‘dispositions’ that characterize persons: loyal wife, devoted father, faithful friend”
(39). Generic characters thus seem to provide important meeting points for cultural expectations
and individual life stories.
Folk psychology, therefore, is not merely or primarily a descriptive but a thoroughly normative
and canonical system of knowledge. Before his Acts of Meaning, Bruner had explored, together
with Joan Lucariello, how the 22–33-month-old Emily Otter started as a storyteller at first by
strictly confining herself to telling what is regular, appropriate, and expected in her immediate
world (Bruner & Lucariello 2006). What Emily accomplishes, the authors maintain, “can almost
be called a triumph of ordinariness, a kind of routinization in story” (96). One of Emily’s most
memorable monologues recounts the course of a whole day, yet according to her mother, “no
particular Friday, but rather some appropriate day, one in which events dovetail predictability,
appropriately, with proper affect and action…” (91).
The joint article conveys the significance of canonicity in Emily’s advance as a language user in
a commanding way. It documents how Emily invests heavily in learning and composing the
canonical course of events, the normal sequences of events, how things should happen in her
world. Katherine Nelson further particularizes that children usually learn how to tell about the
exceptions of canonicity only from the age of 5 or 6 onwards (Nelson 2003: 28). However, there
4is no reason to believe that the folk psychological task of getting to know the ordinary would
then be over, quite the contrary. This study arguably has a crucial role in the development of
Bruner’s argument on canonicity and breach, by demonstrating that canonicity is not merely a
hypothetical abstraction or suggested image in the background of narrative, but indeed
something very tangible and observable that small children are eager to learn and to have a
practical command of, in order to be competent agents and tellers.
Bruner seems to build strategic tension between narrative and folk psychology in his formula
about canonicity and breach, because, according to his famous formulation, “it is only when
constituent beliefs in a folk psychology are violated that narratives are constructed” (AM: 39).
Moreover, if a person radically departs from the prevailing folk psychological expectations, his
or her behaviour would even be judged “folk-psychologically insane,” unless he or she can
articulate an adequate corrective narrative. From this perspective narratives accomplish a crucial
task within the system of folk psychology, for they are “purpose-built for rendering the
exceptional and the unusual into comprehensive form” (47). Folk psychology cannot only claim
the canonical, it also needs to contain the mechanisms for dealing with the exceptions. For
Bruner, the primary moderating mechanism is the narrative, and he maintains that the “function
of the story is to find an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a
deviation from a canonical cultural pattern” (49–50). Narrative as a mode or capacity is thus
included in canonicity, in the sense that every proper narrative has to deviate from it.
Bruner does not explicitly elaborate folk psychology as any kind of generalized or abstracted
capacity of mind reading, at least in the sense that many cognitive narratologists and cognitive
theorists later argued (Palmer 2004; Zunshine 2006).  For Bruner, people mostly understand each
other because of the shared common sense and canonical expectations. Elsewhere, I have argued
that the difference between the perspectives of folk psychological understanding and mind
reading may be radical (Hyvärinen 2015). Equally, the primary consequence of a violation of
expectations is not a sudden surge of mind reading but the need to tell and hear folk
psychological, corrective narratives. If so, Bruner contends, we need to “consider the nature of
narrative” (AM: 35). At this juncture, I suspend discussion of Bruner for now in order to
consider the nature of narrative, albeit at the moment in the company of Monika Fludernik’s
theory of narrativity. Bruner and Fludernik share a particular interest in the phenomena of mind.
Moreover, Fludernik’s theory embraces experientiality and the role of oral narration, thus
making her theory a particularly interesting counterpart to Bruner.
5Narrative and experientiality
Fludernik’s major work Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (1996) has an interesting place within
the history of narratology. Fludernik draws heavily from cognitive theory, primarily from
cognitive linguistics and frame theory, yet she affords no discussion about folk psychology or
about the later popular mind reading. She builds equally on the traditions of sociolinguistics and
narratology, foregrounding the relevance of everyday storytelling for the narrative theory, yet,
without any explicit references to Bruner’s work. For a number of reasons, including her move
further away from the Saussurean theory of language, Fludernik’s work is one of the milestones
in the road from structuralism to what was later termed as “postclassical narratology” (Herman
1999; Alber & Fludernik 2010).
Right at the beginning of her work, Fludernik writes:
Unlike the traditional models of narratology, narrativity […] is here constituted by what I
call experientiality, namely by the quasi-mimetic evocation of ‘real-life experience’.
Experientiality can be aligned with actantial frames, but it also correlates with the
evocation of consciousness or with the representation of a speaker role. (Fludernik 1996,
12–13)
At this point, there seems to be no major disagreement with Bruner, who in turn has emphasized
the relevance of two different “landscapes of narrative,” namely the “landscape of action” and
the “landscape of consciousness” (Bruner 1986: 20–21). The latter one can now, for the time
being, be re-described as “experientiality.” A few sentences later, however, the clash of positions
becomes evident:
Where the current proposal supersedes this setup is in the redefinition of narrativity qua
experientiality without the necessity of any actantial groundwork. In my model there can
therefore be narratives without plot, but there cannot be any narratives without a human
(anthropomorphic) experiencer of some sort at some narrative level. (Fludernik 1996: 13,
italics added).
More than once, Fludernik emphatically criticizes the presumed relevance of sequentiality, as
well as the Proppian actantial models. She asserts that her “radical elimination of plot” is “based
6on the results of research into oral narrative” (13), yet this is the first obvious point of
disagreement with Bruner, who in turn characterizes narrative in the spirit of structuralism as
follows:
Perhaps [narrative’s] principal property is its inherent sequentiality, a narrative is
composed of a unique sequence of events, mental states, happenings involving human
beings as characters or actors. These are its constituents. […] [These constituents’]
meaning is given by their place in the overall configuration of the sequence as a whole – its
plot or fabula. (AM, 43)
Drawing from the studies into oral narration, the literary theorist Fludernik is ready to renounce
the constitutive role of sequentiality and plot,2 while the psychologists Bruner, drawing from the
models of Vladimir Propp (1968) and William Labov (1972), among others, elevates
sequentiality as the most fundamental structural property of narrative.  Interestingly, Bruner’s
choice of terms is not the more abstract, complex, and flexible concept of “temporality,”
suggested earlier by Paul Ricoeur (1981), but instead the formalist and straightforward
sequentiality3 (see Hyvärinen et al. 2010). It is clear that Bruner’s orientation here is towards
rather big, finished, coherent, and individually completed stories, in contrast to the many
conversational, shared and unfinished stories that Fludernik’s proposal makes easier to
understand (De Fina & Georgakopoulou 2008).
As much as Bruner (1990) revised our pragmatic and functional understanding of narrative, his
structural description of narrative nevertheless remains within the confines of sequentiality.4
Sometimes he even seems to betray his major argument with his commitment to narrative
formalism. After claiming, convincingly, that narrative is one of the most ubiquitous “discourse
forms in human communication,” he proceeds to a more daring claim: “Narrative structure is
even inherent in the praxis of social interaction before it achieves linguistic expression” (77).5 At
the minimum, this claim is perplexingly obscure, and in the worst case might be understood to
represent the “narrative imperialism,” of extending narrative’s range of reference beyond
acceptable limits (Phelan 2005).6 What narrative structure, in which sense, and how in “in the
praxis of social interaction”? In arguing for the huge cultural relevance of narrative, Bruner
fosters an occasional wish to embed narrative deeper and deeper into human action and mind,
thereby jeopardizing the analytic clarity and power of the concept. To specify my argument, I
will next elaborate the complications these kind of structural claims pose for his functional
argument.
7Let me repeat the argument. At first, Bruner pronounces, “Folk psychology is invested in
canonicality. It focuses upon the expectable and/or the usual in the human condition” (AM: 47).
Next he powerfully argues that “it is only when constituent beliefs in folk psychology are
violated that narratives are constructed” (39). Narratives, therefore, specialize “in the forging of
links between the exceptional and the ordinary” (47). It seems to me that these vital functional
claims never properly connect with Bruner’s conception of the structures of narrative.
Narratives, on the one hand, are commentary on deviations from the canonicity; this canonicity,
on the other hand, is always already organized or structured like narrative (35). For sure,
sequentiality can credibly characterize the sphere of folk psychological canonicity, and may well
be fitted together with the course of expected, generic social interaction. But narratives – in order
to be able to expiate and moderate the consequences of the deviations from the expected – need
to draw equally from the canonical, the exceptional, and the moment of disturbance. As in terms
of Labov’s (1972) theory of oral narrative, a proper narrative includes the structural element of
“complicating action,” which can exist on the level of canonicity only in a potential form, as a
category of something that may sometimes happen. In consequence, these forms of knowledge
cannot exactly be similarly organized, unless we totally downplay the relevance of the breach
and the surprise. Bruner’s functional opening with canonicity and breach thus does not fit non-
problematically with his trust in formalism.
As a way out, I have three preliminary proposals. According to my first and possibly most
radical proposal, the concept of “narrative structure,” as a collective singular, should be seen as
an entirely redundant idea. Historically, the idea of a singular narrative structure belongs to
structuralist narratology, and in the search for narrative grammar. We can investigate different
narratives, narrative modes, and genres from the perspective of structure, yet my claim is that
there is no real equivalent for the abstracted and universalized term narrative structure.7 There is
no such structure informing, framing, and structuring all kinds of narratives. To speculate about
it primarily constitutes a category mistake. As I wrote above, Bruner uses the term without
giving much more content to it than the idea of sequentiality.
Secondly, I suggest revising the claim that folk psychology’s “organizing principle” is narrative.
Rather than relying here on the global opposition between narrative and conceptual forms of
knowledge, I prefer David Herman’s (2002) strategy to characterize the canonical layer of
knowledge in terms of cultural scripts. Scripts indeed have the sequential event structure but
without the singularity of events, the surprise, or the breach of canonicity. Rephrasing Bruner’s
idea, Herman indeed claims that narratives need to use scripts as well as to depart from them.
8Herman’s terminology would clearly save Bruner’s theory from some of its internal
contradictions.
As a more specific attempt at addressing the issue of narrative structure, thirdly, I suggest a
consideration of Labov’s formal model (Labov & Waletzky 1967; Labov 1972). According to
the model, oral narratives (note the restriction) would have the following parts: 1. Abstract, 2.
Orientation, 3.Complicating action, 4. Evaluation, 5. Result or resolution, 6. Coda (Labov 1972:
363). This structural model, however, immediately encounters serious difficulties. For one thing,
scholars have argued for a long time, and convincingly, that there are oral narratives, which do
not fit in with this generalized model (e.g., Hymes 1996: 192–199). Martin and Rose (2008), for
example, suggest such narrative modes as recount, anecdote, exemplum, and observation, which
are structured in a different way. Ochs and Capps (2001) find more open structures from the
conversational narratives. It is very hard to distil a shared and informative “structure” from this
variety of stories, a structure that could equally cover the experimental fiction as well. Secondly,
it is clear that any of these structural versions cannot be equalled with the course of social
interaction, or found relevant in characterizing the folk psychological form of knowledge.
Moreover, Emanuel Schegloff specifically criticizes Labov’s model for forgetting the
interactional setting, and assuming that the teller recounts the story in an isolated, non-interactive
setting. Schegloff accentuates that ordinary storytelling is “a coconstruction, an interactional
achievement, a joint production, a collaboration, and so on” (Schegloff 1997: 97). The real task,
for him, consists in positing the storytelling within the frame of interaction and considering the
narrative structures only within this context, not in transposing a presumed narrative structure
into the interaction. This third alternative, equally, leads to the recommendation to renounce the
idea of narrative structure.
Experience and expectations
At this point, however, it is a good time to consider Fludernik’s idea of experientiality from the
perspective of Bruner’s functional model. Are we able to find something that Bruner could teach
Fludernik? Fludernik attaches her concept of experientiality closely to the idea of human
embodiedness, arguing that “narratives of spontaneous conversational storytelling,” maybe the
oral stories in general, “cognitively correlate perceptual parameters of human experience” (1996:
12). Human experience provides the starting point of the whole argument, and this experiencing
in turn is moderated by the “perceptual parameters” of embodied human experience. At first
9glance, this kind of experientiality appears to be rather individual and embedded within the
confines of a singular body. Experiencing, however, is not just about the immediate perception
but is deeply embedded within the fabric of social action.  As Fludernik later argues, “[h]uman
experience typically embraces goal-oriented behaviour and activity, with its reaction to obstacles
encountered on the way” (29). This can reasonably be reconciled with Bruner’s ideas of
canonicity and breach, and his discussion on the Burkean Pentad (AM: 50). She further argues
that all “experience is therefore stored as emotionally charged remembrance, and it is reproduced
in narrative form because it was memorable, funny, scary, or exciting” (1996: 29). But why is
something memorable, funny or scary (and, therefore, worth telling as complicating action as in
Labov’s model)?
Fludernik’s experiencing is directly connected to embodiedness, and the body seems to be the
source of the “cognitive parameters” that “can be regarded as ‘natural’” (1996: 12). Through this
naturalization of the parameters, experiencing itself becomes increasingly ‘natural,’ and for this
reason, possibly, does not invite further theoretical consideration. In what follows, my purpose is
to challenge the cognitive naturalness of experientiality, firstly with the ideas of the feminist
philosopher Joan Scott (1998), secondly with the ideas of the German historian Reinhart
Koselleck (2004). Scott problematizes the rise of experience as a “foundational category” in
recent feminist thought and historiography. She emphasizes the constructed nature of experience,
encapsulating her argument in an elegant sentence:  “Experience is at once always already an
interpretation and in need of interpretation” (69). Her methodological advice after the rejection
of the foundational role of experience is far-reaching, since for her, experience is “not the origin
of our explanation, but that which we want to explain” (69). Indeed, should or could we have
intellectual tools for considering why we have such and such experiences?
Reinhart Koselleck’s theoretical discussion on the “existential pair” of experience and
expectation becomes utterly relevant at this point (Koselleck 2004: 255–275).  I readily admit
that Koselleck writes as a historian, not as a narratologist of any kind. He also writes about
history, portraying experience and expectation as “historical categories,” not about narration as
such. Yet I find his main argument, proposing that expectation and experience are basic
existential categories in orienting human action and categories that necessarily require each
other, quite compelling and informative for narrative thought and the further elaboration of
experientiality.
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Koselleck is known for his studies into asymmetric conceptual pairs, such as Christians and
heathens, or Mensch and Unmensch (2004: 155–191). Expectation and experience, however, do
not belong to such exclusive pairs of historical counter-concepts, rather, they “indicate dissimilar
modes of existence” (261). Koselleck specifies that the categories of expectation and experience
are “merely formal,” in comparison with such pairs of historical studies as war and peace or
work and leisure. However, he claims that “[e]vidently, the categories of ‘experience’ and
‘expectation’ claim a higher, and perhaps the highest, degree of generality, but they also claim an
indispensable application. Here they resemble, as historical categories, those of time and space”
(257). Arguably, time and space are equally indispensable aspects of narrative, categories that
characteristically are differently charged in different narratives, yet necessitating the existence of
the counter-part of the pair. A historian can easily focus, or practically delimit, his or her
particular study on “war” or “leisure,” and ignore the other side of the pair for the time being,
whereas experience and expectation remain necessary aspects of any theoretically charged
historical account: “No expectation without experience, no experience without expectation”
(257).
These are commanding claims if found relevant in narrative theory. Paul Ricoeur, in Oneself as
Another (1992: 161–163),8 is one of the first to make this connection. Ricoeur ponders literary
narratives’ capacity to represent one’s self and identity. One of his counter-arguments is based
on Koselleck. If literary narrative can only recount the past, how can it express adequately the
human existential situation, which equally includes the Koselleckian expectations. For Ricoeur,
the past of literary narrative is only relative, and in narratives “we find projects, expectations,
and anticipations by means of which the protagonists in the narrative are oriented toward their
moral future” (163). In other words, in Ricoeur’s thought, expectations always color the literary
narrative. “In other words,” Ricoeur continues, “the narrative also recounts care. In a sense, it
only recounts care.” In what follows, I intend to study more closely, how the horizon of
expectation works in shaping literary and everyday narratives, and which kind of content one
might attribute to Ricoeur’s bold claim that narrative “only recounts care.”
Koselleck suggested to set the terms expectation and experience on a more abstract existential
and theoretical level than the practice of historiography would normally accommodate. As he
clarifies, “these two categories are indicative of the general human condition; one could say that
they indicate an anthropological condition without which history is neither possible nor
conceivable” (257, italics added). Coming even nearer to the language of narrative theory,
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Koselleck continues:
Hope and memory, or expressed more generally, expectations and experience – for
expectation comprehends more than hope, and experience goes deeper than memory –
simultaneously constitute history and its cognition. They do so by demonstrating and
producing the inner relations between past and future or yesterday, today, or tomorrow.
(Koselleck 2004: 258)
The passage could perfectly and informatively characterize the inner dialectics of much of the
autobiographical narration, and be acutely sensitive as regards such prose as W.G. Sebald’s
Austerlitz (Sebald 2001). Koselleck further redefines experience as “present past,” and
expectation as “future made present” (2004: 259). This refiguring of temporal relationships
intimately resonates with Ricoeur’s (1981, 1984) reflections on narrative time, in particular his
discussion on Augustine’s understanding of time as an “extension of mind” (1984: 16–30).
Ricoeur (2004: 296) explicitly notices “the homologous constitution linking the categories of
historical time in Koselleck and those of internal time in Augustine’s Confessions.” Hope and
memory take indeed place within the mind, and do not entail any objective existence of past and
future. Koselleck proceeds to talk metaphorically about the “space of experience” and “horizon
of expectation.” Almost as if directly commenting upon the discussions about narrative
sequentiality, he writes how
Chronologically, all experience leaps over time; experience does not create continuity in
the sense of an additive preparation of the past. To borrow an image from Christian Meier,
it is like the glass front of a washing machine, behind which various bits of the wash
appear now and then, but are all contained within the drum. (2004, 260, italics added)
Of course, Koselleck still writes above as a historian. As applied to human lives, the metaphor of
a washing machine is almost shocking – as it is tempting. It suggests nothing less than that
experience is not – normally, standardly, automatically, always, you can pick your term – as such
sequentially organized. Julian Barnes (2011: 3) works with such an idea in the beginning of his
novel The Sense of an Ending:
I remember, in no particular order:
- a shiny inner wrist;
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- steam rising from a wet sink as a hot frying pan is laughingly tossed into it…
followed by four similar images without any obvious chronology. The sequential organization of
memory is possibly best understood as an achievement, more specifically, as a narrative
achievement. To further illustrate the relevance of expectations to memory, I turn to some
perplexing autobiographical memories from Barnes (2013).
Missing memory and expectations
In the third part of his recent book Levels of life, Julian Barnes gives an autobiographical account
about the time of the death of his spouse Pat Kavanagh and his own brittle recovery and
working-through afterwards. Barnes had met Kavanagh forty years ago and had been married to
her since 1979. According to the account, the marriage was both long and intensive, Barnes and
Kavanagh being the best friends and active in versatile cultural as well as hiking activities. In
2008, only 37 days after the diagnosis of a brain tumor, Kavanagh died. In the aftermath of her
death, Barnes suffered from a mysterious loss of memory, or rather of a strangely selective
memory. On the one hand, he says,
… I remember, sharply, last things. The last book she read. The last play (and film, and
concert, and opera, and art exhibition) that we went to together. The last wine she drank,
the last clothes she bought. The last weekend away. The last bed we slept in that wasn’t
ours. The last this, the last that. (Barnes 2013: 98–99)
In contrast to this burning exactness of his memory and capacity to recollect the minute details of
her last moments, there was a gap, most parts of their joint past preceding the January diagnosis
missing:
I remember every detail of her decline, her time in hospital, return home, dying, burial. But
I cannot get back beyond that January; my memory seems burnt away…
And so it feels as if she is slipping away from me a second time: first I lose her in the
present, then I lose her in the past. (97–98)
As always, there are several possible avenues for accounting of this kind of memory loss. One
could refer to a shock or traumatic experiences. However, it is precisely the traumatic part that
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Barnes is able to remember in every painful detail. Barnes was even profoundly irritated by those
friends who avoided speaking about Kavanagh and their joint past, possibly as a gesture of
subtlety, because he himself was not able to remember it and desperately sought out a social
corroboration of the existence of this past.
This loss of memory may at first seem to contradict Bruner’s theory on canonicity and breach.
The death of one’s spouse, if anything, should shatter the canonicity and give a perfect reason for
a full narrative account. Of course, Barnes’ book itself eventually fulfils these terms perfectly,
yet it was published only six years after Kavanagh’s death, and also after the publication of The
Sense of an Ending. How could Bruner and Koselleck help us to understand this disconcerting
memory loss?
A possible way to proceed from the dilemma of trauma is to ask what is it, exactly, that makes
the preceding time so unbearable to remember. Following Koselleck, one might think about the
tremendous breach of the whole horizon of expectation that Barnes had to face. Within the
previous horizon, there were joint hiking expeditions to expect, concerts and plays to attend
together, daily discussions on experiences and the intricacies of work, indeed, the whole social
ethics of life to share. After the diagnosis, practically nothing of this was left while the horizon
was dominated by the approaching death, mourning, and living in the future without Kavanagh
and the palette of sharing. Living through the harsh time ahead with its necessary practicalities
was not bearable if being able and forced to compare between the old and new horizons; thus the
selective oblivion. Something similar is suggested by Michael Pickering (2004: 279) in a
comment on Koselleck, saying that “you may be without the time needed to modify, with any
reasonable adequacy, the framework that links experience and expectation.” Quite convincingly,
this indeed was Barnes’s dilemma.  Barnes’s amnesia not only accentuates the relevance of the
“horizon of expectation” in the study of human lives, it also hints at a potential narrowness in
Bruner’s theory of canonicity, a point I will elaborate in the next section.
Canonicity and the horizon of expectation
For Bruner, canonicity with all the embedded expectations is exclusively based on the
accumulated cultural experience. This is not the case with Koselleck in his historical theory, who
in fact argues that one distinctive feature of modernity is the growing distance between the
“space of experience” and “the horizon of expectations.” The media researcher Michael
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Pickering (2004: 272) notices that the metaphor of the horizon “is the supreme locus of promise
and possibility. It stands for the potential to transcend our present limits…” Pickering’s primary
interest is focused on the societal and cultural level, nevertheless he appositely foregrounds the
“exhilaration” embedded in the seaside vision of the vast, open horizon. Expectations, thus, can
embrace many more dynamic aspects than the partly overlapping concept of canonicity.
Expectations and canonicity thus create partly different backgrounds and motivations for
narration. Bruner, when he refers to the role of Marx, Darwin, and Freud, seems in fact to be
alluding to this other aspect of expectations.
In contrast to this general vision of modernity, there are still antithetical contexts that allow only
for the most compelling canonicity, narrowing down the horizon of expectation to the utter
minimum. Primo Levi’s (1996) account of Auschwitz Monowitz provides a number of sharp
observations about the danger of expectations. “I already know the Lager well enough to realize
that one should never anticipate, especially optimistically” (107), “Do you know how one says
‘never’ in camp slang? ‘Morgen früh,’ tomorrow morning” (133) and, finally, in a more explicit
and refined form:
In the Lager it is useless to think, because events happen for the most part in an
unforeseeable manner; and it is harmful, because it keeps alive a sensitivity which is a
source of pain, and which some providential natural law dulls when suffering passes a
certain limit. (Levi 1996: 171)
Levi obviously depicts the hazard of thinking anything outside the immediate camp routine. The
distance between “now” and “possibly someday somewhere” was too enormous to cross,
meaning that the mere thinking about the future could crush the prisoner mentally. It was
dangerous to have expectations attached to normal life, because these images of normal life
could render the current experiences utterly unbearable.
I conclude this section by proposing that expectations, be they canonical or drawn from the
wider horizon of expectation, obviously play a central role in the way experiences are gained,
reflected, and remembered. The study of narratives, therefore, cannot confine itself to the
“landscape of action,” nor is the aspect of experientiality, eventually, enough to cover the whole
range of Bruner’s “landscape of consciousness.” In a profound sense, narrative analysis must
always visit the aspect of expectations, and answer questions concerning the relationships
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between narrative, experience, and expectations.
Non-prototypical narrative modes
The preceding argument has mostly concerned the dialectics of canonicity, expectations, and
experientiality in the case of prototypical (Herman 2009), folk psychological (Hutto 2008), or
good narratives (Bruner 1990: 52–55); that is, without addressing more broadly other categories
of conversational narrative. Next I will turn my attention to some narrative modes that reside
further away from this prototypical center of everyday narratives. In principle, I am not entirely
sure how radically fictional narratives escape this set of pragmatics, at least if we accept that the
“expectations” can equally be betrayed on the level of discourse. Thus, for example, a
deliberately boring story builds its breach of canonicity on the level of narrative discourse.
Canonical telling, of course, is itself one version of canonical action. The much discussed
unnatural narratives, per definition, seem to specialize in breaking all kinds of expectations about
events, minds, and ways of telling (see Alber, Nielsen & Richardson 2013). Yet, as Bruner has it,
the prototypical narratives specialize “in the forging of links between the exceptional and the
ordinary” (AM: 47). Fiction, including the unnatural narratives, quite obviously draws from this
everyday pragmatics, use it as a resource but equally suspends the everyday wish for forging
links between the exceptional and the ordinary. Fiction is able and often determined to leave the
strange to stay, without connecting it safely to the ordinary, in ways that are not preferred in
most everyday genres. However, these differences in pragmatic functions are not clear-cut and
categorical. There is fiction, and not bad fiction, which more or less clearly follows the
Brunerian pragmatics. At least one thing is certain, namely that the balance between the strange
and the ordinary varies dramatically between different genres.
As mentioned above, there are conversational narrative modes that depart from the prototypical
model in important ways, as do their functions. More specifically, narrative scholars have
identified different exceptions to the Labovian (1972) oral story.9 Catherine Kohler Riessman
(1990) introduces two such modes, “habitual narrative” and “hypothetical narrative.” Riessman
gives the following example of habitual narrative by a divorced woman:
And we stopped talking early on in our marriage really. And he spent more and more time
at work, he didn’t want to come home. He’d come home and than [!] I would say, “I’d like
you to spend a little time with the kids.” He’d just want go up and read a book, kind of
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thing. We just didn’t communicate really. (76)
This narrative section does not exhibit any particular course of events. Habitual narratives rather
endeavor to render a description of something that has continued over a period of time. Gérard
Genette (1980: 116) calls this narrative mode iterative; “narrating one time (or rather: at one
time) what happened n times” (italics removed). For a good reason, the passage could even be
called pseudo-iterative, because in the middle of the recurring processes there is a specific verbal
utterance that has unlikely been repeated over and over in the very same form. The first sentence
provides a verbal process that is finished, though possibly slowly, as they “stopped talking.”
After that, the passage mostly contains repetition and a continuous state of affairs.10
Such sections of habitual narration do not typically offer one clear point of breaking canonicity
(in this example, the first sentence may be understood to sanction such a breach). The purpose is
rather to posit a continuous state of affairs for evaluation; here, to say that his mental absence is a
deviation from the canonicity of marital life. Looking from another perspective, such passages
may likewise be conceived as descriptions of an emerging sub-canonicity. If we forget the title
of Riessman’s book (Divorce talk) for a while, we might be able to imagine an enduring state of
mutual silence as a new local canonicity. Having first established such a sub-canonicity, a
husband walking home and suddenly wanting to talk and participate intensively in the family life
would constitute a breach of the new canonicity of silence. At any rate, the passage exhibits not a
neutral record of a marriage, everything that is said is related to expectations and draws its
meaning in relation to these expectations.
What then about Reissman’s “hypothetical” narrative? This term too has a parallel term in
literary theory, namely Gary Saul Morson’s (1994) “side-shadowing.” When asked to tell about
their life and experiences, ordinary narrators frequently resort to hypothetical telling, that is,
telling abundantly about what might have happened, even though it did not. In these cases, the
relationship between canonicity and breach differs again from the standard Labovian story. I
have taken my example from Sonja Miettinen’s (2006) research into daughters’ narratives about
the death of their mothers. In the following passage one of the daughters, “Silja,” accounts for
the death of her father:
1. For me, for example, one of the most important things
2. in my sorrow was
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3. that I went to the hospital and
4. I was left in total peace there;
5. nothing like, now comes the priest,
6. and now comes a person from the funeral parlour,
7. or now comes somebody, or comes the doctor or comes the autopsy.
8. I was left in total peace; I was there with
9. my husband, saying goodbye to my father [starts crying]. (138, my translation)
This highly emotional passage of Silja’s story would have been a rather sparse account of
visiting her dead father had she not incorporated the lines 5–7, as a hypothetical but not at all
realized course of events. These sentences, all in negative form, tellingly focus on the expected,
as if elevating a presumed canonicity as a threat to the intimacy of bidding farewell to her father.
Regardless of the actual rate of canonicity, these sentences densely convey Silja’s troubled
expectations before meeting her dead father. What she performs, in fact, is to construe and
intensify the whole narrativity of the episode, not by telling what happened, but by framing the
event with the distressing expectations. By first building the hypothetical canonicity, she is also
able to breach it.
The thorniest alternative, and truly far away from the prototypical center, may be the “future
narratives,” suggested by Alexandra Georgakopoulou (2007). Obviously, very few of those who
are jointly telling their shared futures would be tempted to inscribe dramatic, unnatural or
subjunctive deviations from the appropriate or canonical way of life. In other words, dramatic
crises, ruptures, or disturbances are hardly incorporated. As Georgakopoulou says, such stories
of “(near) future events (sic projections) are by far the most common type of storytelling in the
group’s conversations and frequent in the email data too. The taleworld of such projected events,
in the same vein as in stories of past events, is temporally ordered and emplotted yet they are
clearly…neglected and marginalized narrative types…” (47, italics added).
Georgakopoulou convincingly demonstrates the relevance and prevalence of this mode of talk-
in-discourse. Yet it is partly a different question – and here I think the jury is still out – as to
what are the benefits of investigating this kind of future talk qua narratives. In the quote above,
the decisive criterion seems to be the sequential order of events. As I suggested earlier, the whole
knowledge form of canonicity can be understood as scripts, that is, as routinized sequences of
events. All kinds of planning is equally characterized by sequential structure. One way to
conceptualize this category of talk might be to understand it as a mixture of storytelling and
planning, as a mode at the (further) limits of narrativity. These prospective narratives hardly
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suggest any breaches of canonicity or failures of expectations. In contrast, the whole interest
seems to be focused on creating a horizon of expectation, and control over the risk of breaches.
Perhaps it would not be too far-fetched to talk about the domestication of the future. The
economy of expectations, at any rate, differs radically from the prototypical narratives.
Prospective narratives seem to be active in creating, consolidating, and sharing new expectations
rather than coping with the failures.
In conclusion, Bruner’s theory on canonicity and breach offers conceptual tools to make
functional distinctions between prototypical and less-than-prototypical modes of narrative.
Moreover, it systematically emphasizes the profoundly social, interactional, and constructive
function of storytelling. Literary theorists sometimes tend to think that the function of
conversational narratives would primarily be informative, in contrast to the aesthetic purposes of
fiction (e.g., Andersson 2015). On my reading, the Brunerian narratives are primarily
interpersonal and social comments as opposed to any information per se. This is reflected by the
fact that even though narratives draw from canonicity and expectations, the canonicity is very
seldom described in any detailed way, and not nearly in the way experimental fiction often
endeavors to do. The researcher who asks his or her interviewee to “tell” about the typical course
of a working day, or “everything that happened yesterday,” will most likely receive a rather dull
chronicle lacking in evaluation, a breach of expectations, or surprises, not a narrative.
The purpose of this article has been to accentuate the relevance of Jerome Bruner’s theory of
canonicity and breach.  This relevance, however, is highlighted by way of the useful revisions
that the work of Monika Fludernik (1996) and Reinhart Koselleck (2004) suggest. Instead of an
inclusive focus on experientiality, Bruner’s and Koselleck’s work equally direct attention
towards the dialectics between experience and the horizon of expectation.
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1 I am grateful to the Academy of Finland research project (285144) The Literary in Life: Exploring the Boundaries
between Literature and the Everyday for supporting my work with this article.
2 ‘Plot’ is not a concept Bruner discusses thoroughly. Instead he assumes a rather straightforward conception of plot as a
combination of sequence and whole. Paul Ricoeur (1984), for example, understands plot as a much more complex and
nuanced concept.
3 Considering the intensity whereby Bruner emphasizes the narrative sequentiality and the fullness of plot, his position,
and the position of the whole narrative turn for that matter, as regards the structuralist and/or hermeneutic traditions
may be more ambivalent and contradictory than Brockmeier and Meretoja (2014: 4,10) have recently suggested.
4 Ricoeur (1981) already comprises a highly critical discussion on Propp and temporality. He quite compellingly
demonstrates how poorly the strict models of sequentiality capture the temporality of the wonder tales, not to mention
the more complex contemporary autobiographies. Bruner (1991) later celebrated the volume wherein Ricoeur’s article
was published (Mitchell 1981), yet he never seemed to fully accept Ricoeur’s criticism of sequentiality.
5 Note here the difference with Ricoeur (1984: 54–56) and his discussion on the “semantics of action” in Mimesis I.
Ricoeur suggests a semantic connection between the pragmatic understanding of action and the capacity to narrate.
According to Fludernik (1996: 22–23), Ricoeur’s Mimesis I “corresponds to the action-oriented parameters of frame
theory.”
21
6 Carr (1986) is a telling and cautionary example of the problematic consequences of transferring narrative from
communication to the sphere of action. Firstly, he boils the narrative structure down to the Aristotelian triad of
beginning, middle, and end, and then finds this rather trivialized structure everywhere (see Hyvärinen 2006).
7 Georgakopoulou (2007: 8) makes a similar point: “What this means for the study of narrative is that instead of treating
it as a supra-genre with fixed structural characteristics (i.e., invariant and inflexible structural units), emphasis is placed
on narrative structures as dynamic and evolving responses to recurring rhetorical situations…”
8 In his Memory, History, Forgetting (2004), Ricoeur holds a more sustained and nuanced discussion on Koselleck and
his role in reshaping the understanding of historiography.
9 Labov (1972) is highly relevant here, because his discussion on narrative evaluation, in particular the necessity of the
“point” of the story, is of course one of the key influences behind Bruner’s theory of canonicity and breach.
10 Herman (2002: 27–51) offers a comprehensive and useful discussion on the varying time frames of different verbal
processes and states.
